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Introduction
The taxation of profits and capital as an impediment to the location (and extent) of investment received much attention in theoretical as well as empirical academic work in public finance (see, e.g., Devereux and Griffith, 1998; Devereux and Hubbard, 2003) . The focus on profit taxation flows from the assumption of capital to be relatively mobile across international borders, at least in comparison to other production factors such as labor. Empirical work, however, points to three issues suggesting that an emphasis on profit taxation may be insufficient: (i) capital and skilled workers have been conjectured and found to be largely complementary in production (see Griliches, 1969; Duffy, Papageorgiou, and Perez-Sebastian, 2004 );
(ii) skilled workers and employees -such as managers, technicians, and researchers -are relatively mobile across international borders (see Chiswick, 1999; Liebig and Sousa-Poza, 2004; Grogger and Hanson, 2008) ; and (iii) the profit tax base can easily be manipulated (by transfer pricing, debt shifting, etc.) while this is much harder for the labor (or income) tax base. Hence, income taxation may be relevant for headquarters location to the extent that it affects the local availability of skilled workers (and their effort) and even education choice of individuals in the long run.
There is anecdotal evidence that the (re-)location of headquarters of large multinational firms in recent years has been co-determined by issues of profit and labor taxation.
5 Most of the theoretical and empirical literature on the location of firms considers (employee-and employer -borne) income tax aspects only implicitly.
6 If 1 at all, previous work on firm location considered the role of profit taxation, but abstained from explicitly shedding light on income taxation issues. 7 The roles played by the net wage, the income tax rate, and, more generally, the employee's income tax burden, as opposed to the employer's tax burden, in determining firm locations are virtually unexplored.
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We argue that a higher employer -borne income tax burden on high-skilled labor directly reduces a firm's profits, as they represent a direct cost for the firm unless the tax burden can be fully passed on to employees. A higher employee-borne income tax burden exercises a negative effect on managerial effort and, hence, indirectly reduces a firm's profits. Provided that headquarters services intensively use high-skilled labor in particular (see Carr, Markusen, and Maskus, 2001; Markusen, 2002) , the level of social security contributions and the level of income tax rates, as well as their progressivity should be important for a country's attractiveness as headquarters'
location. The present paper assesses these hypotheses in the following way.
Union for the period 1997-2002 and finds that the location of service activities depends in particular on functional aspects and that headquarters location does not seem to attract any other part of a firm's value chain. Bel and Fageda (2008) employ firm-level and international flights data on major urban areas in 25 European Union member countries. Their findings indicate that, among others, the proximity to large markets and the supply of direct international flights influence the headquarters location choice positively. Davis and Henderson (2008) use panel data on auxiliary establishments of firms in the United States and show that a higher number of local service input providers and the scale of other headquarters activities nearby stimulates the agglomeration of headquarters. Strauss-Kahn and Vives (2009) investigate the location of headquarters for the United States over the years 1996 to 2001 and find that factors such as low average wages, low corporate tax rates, and the agglomeration of other headquarters in the same sector influence the relocation of headquarters positively. 7 The paper by Egger and Radulescu (2011) is an exception. It considers the effects of labor taxation on bilateral foreign direct investment (FDI) in a cross section of 52 countries rather than headquarters location as such. Their results suggest that bilateral outward FDI is smaller the bigger the difference between host-to-parent country labor tax rates. 8 As aid before, this may be problematic especially, with an interplay of capital-skill complementarity at the headquarters level, the relative mobility of skilled workers, and the relative difficulty of avoiding labor taxes (relative to profit taxes).
First, we construct a unique panel data set on average and marginal effective labor income taxes (including employee-and employer -borne social security contributions, tax credits, and tax allowances and deductions) for 120 economies for all years over the time span 2005-2009 which we then collapse to exploit the crosssectional dimension. 9 We match this data set onto the universe of corresponding cross-sectional data on 37,502 firms from Compustat. This leads to a common data set of 80 countries and 35,206 firms, which can be used for the empirical analysis.
The empirical results suggest that -conditional on other factors of influence such as profit taxes -the probability of a country to be chosen for headquarters location depends negatively on the average level and progressivity of a country's income tax rate, as well as on the extent of social security contributions paid by firms and employees, respectively. The results are most pronounced for employer-borne payroll taxes among all components of effective labour income taxes. On average, a one percentage point increase in a country's average labor income tax rate reduces the probability of it to attract the headquarters of the average firm by 0.023 percentage points versus 7.391 percentage points for a one percentage point increase in employer social security contributions.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. In the next section, we present the data, in particular, on effective labor income tax rates. Section 3 introduces the econometric approach used for empirical analysis -conditional logit and nested logit models. Section 4 summarizes the empirical results, and Section 5 concludes.
Data
In general, we use averaged data for explanatory variables for the period [2005] [2006] [2007] [2008] [2009] and data on the dependent variable -a binary location choice indicator -for 2009.
9 Notice that, with location choice, exploiting a short time period may be very problematic if firms display inertia in relocating headquarters in response to changes in fundamentals.
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Data on headquarters location
Information on the location of firms' headquarters is available from Compustat.
That data set provides the residence country of the headquarters along with other indicators regarding firm organization and balance sheet data for all firms covered -national or multinational in scope. For each company, this allows us to determine the J-nomial variable Loc and the binary variable Loc ij , where the latter is unity whenever, for firm i with i = 1, ...I, Loc = j with j = 1, ...J.
Data on income taxation
One contribution of this paper is the construction of a unique panel data set on effective labor income taxes for 120 countries annually for the years 2005-2009. We follow the methodology of the "Taxing Wages" approach used by the OECD, discussed by Heady (2004) and described in Egger and Radulescu (2011) , to compute marginal and average effective tax rates plus the social security contributions for an individual earning the average wage or five times the average wage of an economy.
Beyond social security contributions, we account for detailed provisions of the respective national tax codes such as personal tax allowances, tax credits, standard deductions, other country-specific formulae and local (subnational) taxes. 10 This data set allows us to consider the importance of the progressivity of a country's income tax schedule beyond the one of average tax rates. The latter appears of particular importance when considering the role of income taxation for high-skilled (and hence, high-income) earners, rather than average workers and employees.
This comprehensive data set on income taxation was assembled from numer- 10 Peter, Buttrick, and Duncan (2010) compute the tax liability for pre-tax incomes equivalent to one, two, three and four times a country's GDP per capita. However, we assume gross wages to be better reflective of the actual income tax base. Also, they do not account for social security contributions and other provisions which we consider as important for inference of the effective tax burden on labor. 11 We follow Grilliches (1980) to use the perpetual inventory method for calculating countryspecific capital stocks. The capital stock of country j in year t is
where I jt is real investment (gross fixed capital formation in constant U.S. dollars of the year 2000)
in country j and year t and δ denotes the depreciation rate, which we assume to be 10 percent.
The capital stock K j0 in the first period of the sample is computed as in middle-to-low-income economies, and 75 in low-income economies. [ Table 2 about here] Table 2 summarizes features of the most important data across country groups by income category as defined above. As expected, higher-income countries tend to be larger, tax higher, have better infrastructure, etc., than lower-income countries.
Furthermore, 77.6% of all headquarters in the sample are located in high-income economies. Middle-to-high income economies host around 14.9% of the headquarters covered, and only around 0.2% of the headquarters are located in low-income economies.
Empirical strategy
This section introduces the empirical specifications used to identify whether and to which extent labor taxes, social security contributions, and the progressivity of a tax system ceteris paribus play a role in a firm's decision about where to locate its headquarters.
Conditional logit
To estimate choice behavior, one model is the conditional logit model (McFadden, 1974) , as illustrated in Figure 1 . This model is suitable to address the question of how a country's characteristics, such as the effective taxes on labor income, affect a country's likelihood of being chosen as a firm's headquarters location.
As previously explained in Section 2.1, we denote the dependent variable, which takes the value one if firm i = 1, ...I has its headquarters in country j = 1, ...J and zero otherwise by Loc ij . To determine the probability that country j is chosen as the location of firm i's headquarters, we first define the deterministic net return that would be derived from locating in country j, V ij as
where x j denotes a vector of alternative-specific variables facing the headquarters of firm i in country j, such as AverageLabT ax j , P rog500 j , EmployeeSocSec j ,
R&D j , and z i is a vector of firm-specific variables.
The conditional probability of headquarters location for firm i in country j is first estimated using the following logistic regression model
Because we are ultimately interested in estimating the probability of any headquarters locating in country j, rather than in estimating the one of a specific headquarters i locating in j, we exclude firm-specific variables and rewrite the net return maximization model and the conditional probability in general terms as
As is well known, β can be estimated consistently if the following assumptions hold:
first, error terms associated with the stochastic version of (6) must be identically and independently distributed and, second, the independence of irrelevant alternatives (IIA) criterion must be met. It turns out that international headquarters' location 
Nested logit
To overcome the bias of the conditional logit model flowing from a violation of the IIA, we employ the nested logit model as an alternative econometric approach, because it relaxes the IIA criterion by employing a hierarchical choice structure. In the nested logit model, we group countries by per-capita income, (low, middle-low, middle, middle-high, and high) in 2005 following the World Bank's categorization as introduced in Section 2.4. The decision to locate in country j is split into first the choice of the nest of countries j belongs in, N (j), which is determined by nestspecific characteristics that do not vary within the nest, and subsequently, the choice among the countries within the nest, as illustrated in Figure 2 . The deterministic net return of firm i from locating its headquarters in country j is then specified as
where x j is a vector of alternative-specific variables firm i faces in country j, w n denotes a vector of nest-specific variables determining the choice of nest N (j), and z i is a vector of firm-specific variables. 13 In the absence of z i , the generalized net return maximization model now reads
The probability of locating in country j can be split into the product of the conditional probability of locating in country j if country j belongs in nest N (j) -term (a) in equation (9) -and the probability of j being in nest
We split the two components of equation (9) above, namely the conditional probability within nest N (j), term (a), and the probability of country j being in nest N (j), term (b), to derive the model for the probability of locating in country j. Starting with term (a), we can describe the conditional probability within nest
where
13 In the generalized version, we set up the nested logit model such that the alternative-specific variables have a non-alternative-specific coefficient, while the nest-specific variables have nestspecific coefficients. We do this since alternative-specific variables will have an equal influence on firms, while the influence of nest-specific variables are indeed nest-specific.
The random net return maximization model adopted here imposes the least restrictions on the structure of the nested logit model and allows us to compare countries even across nests rather than only within a nest. In that model, the dissimilarity parameter, τ N (j) , is a measure of the uniqueness of the country-alternatives within nest N (j) and is defined as
where ρ N (j) denotes the correlation coefficient within nest N (j), which is determined by the error correlation among the individual alternatives in nest N (j). If the correlation among countries within a nest is positive, then τ N (j) will be within the unit interval.
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The term (b) in equation (9) represents the conditional probability of choosing country j in nest N (j) and can be expressed as
By multiplying the two probabilities defined in equations (10) and (13), we obtain the probability of choosing country j as the headquarters location.
By obtaining estimates for the V ij in the nested logit model, we can evaluate the probability of choosing country j as a location of headquarters. We will summarize the nested logit model results and the respective choice probabilities and marginal effects in Tables 6-8. 14 It is possible that the correlation of countries within a nest is negative, resulting in a |τ N (j) | > 1.
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Estimation results
As explained above, we hypothesize ceteris paribus a negative effect of AverageLabT ax j , P rog500 j , EmployeeSocSec j and EmployerSocSec j , on a country's attractiveness as a potential headquarters location. Higher labor income taxes, higher employeeborne social security contributions and a more progressive tax system exert a negative effect on effort of high-income earners, such as managers and engineers, whereas higher employer -borne social security contributions represent higher direct labor costs for firms such that all four variables negatively affect expected profits, directly or indirectly. The effects of these variables of interest are estimated conditionally on a number of aforementioned control variables such as CorpT ax j , GDP j , CapStock j , W age j , T ertEdu j and F lights j , and three interaction terms, W age j × T ertEdu j , CapStock j × GDP j and W age j × GDP j . These control variables account for determinants of headquarters location choice beyond labor taxes.
We rationalize the effects of these additional controls in the following way: higher corporate taxes CorpT ax j and higher average gross wages W age j should reduce a country's attractiveness as a potential location for headquarters since they both reduce profits ceteris paribus. In line with previous theoretical research, we expect that a higher capital stock CapStock j , a proxy for the availability of capital in a country, and a higher GDP j as a measure of market size positively influence the inclination of firms to locate in a particular country. Finally, a more educated population, T ertEdu j , as well as a better traffic and airport infrastructure, F lights j should also increase a country's attractiveness as a potential host for headquarters.
The interaction terms W age j × T ertEdu j , W age j × GDP j and CapStock j × GDP j control for a possibly lesser importance of wage costs in skill-abundant and large markets on the one hand and of market size and capital-abundance (as a measure of development) on the other hand. All variables except AverageLabT ax j , P rog500 j ,
CorpT ax j , EmployeeSocSec j and EmployerSocSec j are measured in logs. For these variables we use the log of one minus the respective variable in our regressions, since a considerable number of countries have labor income, social security, and 13 corporate income taxes of zero. This is why positive coefficients for the first five dependent variables reported in Tables 3 and 6 actually reflect the negative impact of the underlying tax components. [ Tables 3-5 about here] However, we should be careful with the interpretation of the coefficients of our main variables of interest presented in Table 3 , as the underlying econometric model is non-linear in the parameters. In order to obtain more informative results, we translate these coefficients into marginal probabilities and marginal effects, which are presented in Tables 4 and 5 , respectively. Table 5 reports the marginal effects obtained from the conditional logit specification for all countries in our sample using all the variables contained in Model (2). Column A in Table 5 shows the results for a one percentage point increase in the labor income tax whereas Columns B and C report the results for a marginal increase in the degree of progressivity of a country's tax system and the corporate income tax rate, respectively. The last two columns, namely Columns D and E, display the results for a one percentage point increase in the employer-and employee-borne social security contributions. Accordingly, on average a one percentage point increase in a country's average labor income tax leads to a decrease in the conditional probability of a country as a potential location for headquarters by 0.023 percentage points. A glance at the numbers suggests that for a one percentage point increase in a country's average labor income tax, the reduction in probabilities range between 0.228 percentage points in Japan or 0.302 percentage points in the U.S. to no change at all in countries such as Bolivia or Zambia. As the numbers in Column D of Table 5 suggest, the results are most pronounced for a marginal change in employer-borne social security contributions. Accordingly, the decrease in the conditional probability of a country as a potential location for headquarters is on average 7.391 percentage points. These results confirm our prior, since, as argued in the introduction, employer-borne payroll taxes represent direct costs for the company, whereas higher labour income taxes influence profits only indirectly, via lower marginal effort. One should also note that the numbers in Column C of Table 5 imply a lower magnitude of the marginal effects for an increase in the corporate tax. We argue that this result can be ascribed to the possibility of corporate profit shifting to low tax locations. In comparison, the income tax base (wage bill) cannot be as easily manipulated as the profit tax base, which leads to relatively bigger effects of labour income taxes and social security contributions on the location choice than of profit taxes. 
Conditional logit results
Nested logit results
For the reasons explained in Section 3.1, the nested logit model is a more appropriate technique to correctly identify the headquarters location choice. Table 6 reports the results of a nested logit model, employing the average log of GDP per capita for each nest as the nest-specific variable, w n . As in the conditional logit specification, the coefficients of our main variables of interest, namely AverageLabT ax j , P rog500 j , EmployeeSocSec j , and EmployerSocSec j are positive 16 and highly significant in all three models. The results reported as under Models (1), (2) and (3) just differ with respect to the number of covariates employed, as explained in Section 4.1 above. The size of the coefficients for P rog500 j , EmployerSocSec j , and CorpT ax j are about the same as in Table 3 and they are higher for AverageLabT ax j and EmployeeSocSec j .
The marginal effects for all countries in our sample are reported in Table 8 . Table 8 displays the results for a one percentage point increase in the -average labor income tax (Column A), in the tax system's degree of progressivity (Column B) , in the corporate income tax (Column C) and in employer-and employee-borne social security contributions (Columns D and E) -on the probability of headquarters location in a specific country. A one percentage point rise in the average labor income tax induces on average a decrease in the probability of a high-income country of being a potential location for headquarters by 0.072 percentage points. The reduction in probability is smaller for the other country groups amounting to 0.032, 0.032, and 0.002 percentage points for middle-high, middle-low and low income economies, respectively. Once again, the results vary to a large extent among countries. In the United States, a one percentage point rise in the average labor income tax induces a reduction in the probability of headquarters locating there by 0.619 percentage Hence, in the latter specification, a one percentage point rise in the corporate tax rate reduces the probability of a state as a headquarters location by 2.25%. As Strauss-Kahn and Vives (2009) also note, these lower elasticities compared to other studies can also be explained by the fact that these studies focus on manufacturing firms which creates an upward bias in the corporate tax effect whereas Strauss-Kahn and Vives (2009) points, whereas in countries such as Bahamas the reduction amounts to only 0.004 percentage points.
[ Tables 6-8 about here] Once again, the strongest effects arise in case of employer-borne social security contributions (Column D) , where the decrease in probability is 1.5 times as large as for the average labour income tax (Column A). Akin to the conditional logit model results profit taxes are found to be less important than income tax elements for headquarters location choice. Overall, our findings suggest that the level of the labor income tax, the progressivity of a country's income tax schedule, and employeeand employer -borne social security contributions affect the conditional probability of a country being chosen as the headquarters location to a sizable extent, e.g., when being compared to profit taxation. Furthermore, for the reasons explained in Section 3.2, the nested model relaxes the IIA criterion and accordingly especially the marginal effects of social security contributions are tempered compared to the conditional logit model.
Conclusion
This paper provides evidence on the impact of different components of effective labor taxes on the international location decision of firms' headquarters using data on 35,026 firms' headquarters and 80 countries. We compile a unique data set on effective labor income taxes comprising besides labor taxes also both employee-borne and employer-borne social security contributions as well as further country specific regulations. We merge this tax data with data from Compustat that provides information on the location of firms' headquarters and data from WDI on country specific characteristics. The richness of our tax data and the large number of firm headquarters' observations as well as the econometric specifications employed allow a more precise identification of the impact of effective labor taxes on firms headquarters' location.
Overall, our findings suggest that the progressivity of a country's tax schedule, the social security contributions levied and the level of the labor income tax affect the conditional probability of firms' headquarters location choice. The results are most pronounced for employer-borne payroll taxes. Hence, a one percentage point increase in a country's average labor income tax leads -on average-to a reduction in the probability of a country as a potential location for headquarters by 0.023 percentage points whereas a one percentage point increase in a country's employer social security contributions reduces the probability of headquarters' location by even 7.391 percentage points.
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